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Nietzsche as a Critic of Genealogical Debunking:
Making Room for Naturalism without Subversion
MATTHIEU QUELOZ AND DAMIAN CUENI
Origin and critique of moral valuations. These two things do not
coincide, as is facilely supposed (this belief is itself already the result of a
moral judgment to the effect that “something that has come to be in such
and such a way is worth little because its origin is immoral”).
—Nietzsche, eKGWB 1885, 2[131]
This paper argues that Nietzsche is a critic of just the kind of genealogi-
cal debunking he is popularly associated with. We begin by showing that
interpretations of Nietzsche which see him as engaging in genealogical de-
bunking turn him into an advocate of nihilism, for on his own premises, any
truthful genealogical inquiry into our values is going to uncover what most
of his contemporaries deem objectionable origins and thus license global
genealogical debunking. To escape nihilism and make room for naturalism
without indiscriminate subversion, we then argue, Nietzsche targets the way
of thinking about values that permits genealogical debunking: far from trying
to subvert values simply by uncovering their origins, Nietzsche is actively
criticising genealogical debunking thus understood. Finally, we draw out the
consequences of our reading for Nietzsche’s positive vision.
ABSTRACT
Running counter to the popular view of Nietzsche as the archetypalgenealogical debunker who criticises values by revealing their
objectionable origins, this paper argues that even in On the Genealogy of
Morality (GM), there is an important respect inwhichNietzsche is a critic
of genealogical debunking. This contrasts with three common reactions
to the book. The first is to embrace Nietzsche’s project, understood as
the attempt to criticise by revealing objectionable origins.1 The second is
1 See, e.g., Hoy (2009), who understands genealogy as “a philosophical method of
analysis of how certain cognitive structures, moral categories, or social practices have
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to dismiss Nietzsche’s project, so understood, because it falls prey to the
genetic fallacy.2 The third is to dismiss the impression that Nietzsche
is concerned with genealogical debunking at all: while it may look
like Nietzsche is criticising by uncovering objectionable origins, he is
really doing something else—evaluating our present values by their
tendency to promote human flourishing,3 perhaps, or belabouring our
sentiments through powerful rhetoric.4 In contrast to all three reactions,
we want to vindicate both the impression that the GM is concerned
with genealogical debunking and Nietzsche’s project. We maintain
that his project, correctly understood, is concerned with genealogical
debunking, but in order to criticise it. Far from criticising values by
revealing their objectionable origins, Nietzsche criticises those whose
conceptions of values make those origins seem objectionable.5
come into being historically in ways that are contrary to the ordinary understanding
of them” (223). Geuss (1994) reads the GM as an internal critique of Christian
morality. Ridley (1998) takes a similar line, but views the critique as directed at a
wider audience than just Christians. See also Owen (2003, 2007). Loeb (1995) reads it
as a condemnation of base origins which hinges on Nietzsche’s aristocratic values.
2 Koopman (2013, 20, 87) and Kim (1990). Solomon (1994), Hoy (1994), Conway (1994),
and, in a different way, Finken (2012) are also critical of fallacious elements in
Nietzsche’s thought. See Queloz (2018) as well as Cueni and Queloz (Manuscript)
for discussions of how genealogies can affect the space of reasons.
3 May (1999) reads it as an evaluation of values by the standard of life-enhancement;
see also Guay (2006). Leiter (2002) reads it as a form of ideology critique designed to
liberate great individuals from a stifling “herd morality.”
4 Janaway (2007). Hatab (2008), Owen (2003, 2007, 2008), and Conway (1997) also stress
the role of rhetoric as opposed to argument. Reginster (2006, 292n34) now denies
that Nietzsche offers a new form of critique in the GM.
5 By foregrounding this particular aspect of Nietzsche’s thought, we of course do not
mean to deny that there is also a considerable extent to whichNietzsche is concerned
to differentially evaluate and (in some cases) undermine the authority of particular
values. But it is a standard view among commentators that it is not the uncovering
of origins itself which does the undermining (see, e.g., Leiter 2002, 139-44). We mean
to complement rather than to upend this standard view by highlighting the respect
in which Nietzsche is in fact critical of such genealogical debunking.
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What leads Nietzsche to criticise genealogical debunking, on our
view, is the need to overcome a problem that is prior to the differential
evaluation of particular values: the problem of making room for a
naturalism that is not indiscriminately subversive. This is a problem
that arises on any reading of Nietzsche onwhich he seeks to understand
values naturalistically without doing away with all values—a position
which, for the purposes of this paper (Nietzsche’s own usage of these
terms is another matter), we might label naturalismwithout nihilism.6
The problem is compounded byNietzsche’s conviction that inquiry into
origins will reveal even the most valued things to be not only merely
natural at root, but also inextricably entangled with things considered
bad or shameful: cruelty, suffering, blood, and horror. For if all things
consideredgood come from things consideredbador shameful,howcan
we avoid the conclusion that any truthful naturalistic inquiry into the
origins of our values is going to prove subversive and ultimately entrain
nihilism? Before Nietzsche can engage in naturalistic explanation and
6 Our use of the term “nihilism” initially foregrounds what Bernard Reginster calls
the “nihilism of disorientation” (2006, 8): the complete lack of normative guidance
entrained by the belief that nothing has value. He contrasts this with the “nihilism
of despair” exemplified by Schopenhauer, a despair engendered by the belief that
the highest values cannot be realised in this world. But on the account we go
on to develop, both kinds of belief are but symptoms of something one can be
committed to without being conscious of it or realising its nihilistic import: the
ascetic conception of values. Viewing the ascetic conception of values as the source
of nihilism accounts for the fact that, as Ken Gemes (Forthcoming) emphasises,
Nietzsche also calls Christianity nihilistic (AC 18–20; eKGWB 1887, 11[367–73]; 1888,
17[4]) although Christians believe neither that nothing has value nor that they
should despair of their values’ realisation. But Christianity harbours an ascetic
conception of values, and as we argue in §2, it is because of this that Nietzsche thinks
“morality will gradually perish” over the “next two centuries” (GM 3.27). For further
discussion of what Nietzsche means by “nihilism,” see Reginster (2006, ch. 1), Gemes
(2008, Forthcoming), and Huddleston (Forthcoming). As for our understanding
of Nietzsche’s naturalism, it follows Kail (2009): we take Nietzsche to advocate a
non-reductive, explanatory naturalism which combines a substantive commitment
to the idea that humans are part of nature with a methodological commitment to
rejecting a priori routes to knowledge. See also Queloz (2017).
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evaluate or rank our values according to their tendency to promote life,
therefore, he needs tomake room for naturalismwithout indiscriminate
subversion.
Nietzsche sometimes (e.g.,GM 2.7) sounds as if one simply has to be
cut from same cloth as him to cheerfully acceptwhat his contemporaries
consider subversive origins.7 This can seem like mere chest-thumping
on Nietzsche’s part, or like an expression of his idiosyncratic values.
But our guiding idea is that Nietzsche in fact offers a cogent and
plausible argument to the effect that not just he, but anyone has reason
to avoid the kind of susceptibility that renders naturalistic genealogical
inquiry invariably subversive, and that whatmakes room for naturalism
without subversion is not a particular set of values, but a different way
of thinking about values.
On our reading, the nihilism-engendering residue of the enchanted
world which renders genealogical explanations of values indiscrimi-
nately subversive is an ascetic conception of values as something peculiarly
pure—pure of any contingent determination by such things as luck,
human interests, or animal urges. In the kind of world Nietzsche takes
us to live in, anyone has reason not to be as susceptible to genealogical
debunking as this conception of values makes one. But as the current
popularity of genealogical debunking arguments brings home, it is by
no means clear that this is a conception of values we have outgrown.8
In Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, for example, Bernard Williams
feels the need to reiterate Nietzsche’s critique of this “deeply rooted
and still powerful misconception” (Williams 2011, 218) which insists
7 See Janaway (2017a, 2017b).
8 We have in mind the debates over whether beliefs can be debunked by showing that
one’s acceptance of them is orthogonal to their truth. See, e.g., Srinivasan (2015),
Mogensen (2016), and DiPaolo and Simpson (2016). Although space constraints
prohibit elaboration, we take the argument we ascribe to Nietzsche to be directly
relevant to the contemporary debate.
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on “abstracting the moral consciousness from other kinds of emotional
reaction or social influence” (2011, 216), conceives of moral value as
lying beyond contingency and luck, “beyond any empirical determi-
nation” (2011, 217), and starkly contrasts such purity with the natural,
emotional, and social forces pervading human life. This, we agree with
Maudemarie Clark, is precisely “Nietzsche’s ultimate problem with
morality” (2015, 61): that it expresses a conception of values as some-
thing that must be “separated out from the normal ‘muck’ of human
life” (Clark 2015, 60).9
Accordingly, it is a less demanding conception of values that Niet-
zsche recommends on our reading. This is the conception of values that
forms the final stage in the process of emancipation from an enchanted
view of the world initiated by the “Death of God,” i.e. the fact that
“belief in God [. . . ] has become unbelievable” (GS 343). Once one goes
far enough in accepting the Death of God, the origins of one’s values,
formerly perceived as destabilising, cease to be destabilising. Although
Nietzsche himself does not put it this way, the point is best introduced
in terms of a schematic depiction of a thought process that leads one
through three stages of atheism. Stage one atheists react to the Death
of God simply by subtracting certain metaphysical beliefs from the
set of their beliefs while retaining their Christian moral values largely
unchanged. Stage two atheists realise the deeper ramifications of the
Death of God: without these metaphysical assumptions, the sorts of
origins necessary for values to be authoritative cease to be available,
and upon reflection, all values are seen to be susceptible to genealogical
debunking. The correct inference to draw from the Death of God is
thus that nothing has value—nihilism. Stage three atheists go one step
9 The present paper can be seen as developing the Williamsian line of interpretation
indicated by Clark at the very end of her “On the Rejection of Morality: Bernard
Williams’s Debt to Nietzsche” (2015).
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further: they realise that the commitments licensing the inference from
the Death of God to nihilism still express a metaphysical perspective
on values. By relinquishing these commitments, stage three atheists
free themselves from the corrosive grip of indiscriminate genealogical
debunking and become able to affirm at least some of their values in
the face of their origins.
Our argument in this paper falls into three parts. In §1, we argue
that given Nietzsche’s own premises, reading him as a genealogical
debunker turns him into an advocate of nihilism, for any truthful
genealogical inquiry into our values is going to uncover what most of
his contemporaries deem objectionable origins—local will turn into
global debunking, subverting our values across the board. To escape
this threat of nihilism, we argue in §2, Nietzsche targets genealogical
debunking itself. The GM criticises a particular way of thinking about
values, because that is what renders any evaluative outlook susceptible
to dissolve into nihilism. In §3, we draw out the consequences of our
reading for Nietzsche’s positive vision.
1. From Local to Global Genealogical Debunking
Any reading of the GM is going to be guided by assumptions about
Nietzsche’s convictions and aims. Two such assumptions in the recent
literature have been the following: (a) Nietzsche aims to offer natu-
ralistic explanations of how values might have arisen out of the rest of
nature without metaphysical interference; (b) Nietzsche is engaged in a
rationally articulated critique of certain values, but he is not a nihilist
who denies that anything has value. These assumptions are widely
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made and have been extensively argued for, so we will take them on
board without rehearsing the arguments.10
Given these assumptions, a natural way to approach the GM is to
look for a link between those two aspects of the book—to identify a sense
in which naturalistic genealogical explanation undermines its object
without leaving us with no values at all. But if one locates the critical
force in the genealogical explanation itself, this sits rather uneasily with
two further assumptions that can safely be made about Nietzsche: (c)
Nietzsche believes that what is now evaluated-as-bad, such as cruelty,
suffering, blood, and horror, is pervasive and something that one is
nearly bound to come across once one inquires deeply enough into
the origins of things that are evaluated-as-good;11 (d) he does not take
origins to be capable of subversion by themselves. Let us examine each
assumption.
(c) Awareness of the Pervasiveness of Suffering, Cruelty, Blood, and
Horror: Nietzsche repeatedly voices a strong awareness of the fact that
inquiry into the origins of what most of his contemporaries regard as
“good” things will reveal them to be inextricably entangled with things
that these same contemporaries regard as “bad,” such as suffering,
cruelty, blood, and horror:
reason, seriousness,mastery over the affects, this entire gloomymatter
called reflection, all these prerogatives and showpieces of man: how
dearly they have been paid for! how much blood and horror there is
at the base of all “good things”! (GM 2.3)
An example of what Nietzsche might have in mind is the role of
slavery in facilitating the birth of philosophical reflection.12 This and
10 See Clark (1998), Leiter (2002), Janaway (2007), and Owen (2007, 2008) for compre-
hensive overviews.
11 How exactly “origins” is to be understood will be addressed in the next section.
12 See Engels (1987, 168) and Williams (1993, 111–17).
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comparable passages (GM 3.9; eKGWB 1873, 29[172]; EH “Untimely” 1;
UM 2.1; D 49) lead Williams to note Nietzsche’s “hypersensitivity to
suffering” (2012, 143) and refusal to forget that suffering was necessary
to achieving things that are now greatly valued. “All good things were
once bad things” (GM 3.9), Nietzsche writes, and as Williams argues,
this is one of Nietzsche’s “fundamental tenets” (2012, 143), which,
before it becomes a principle of interpretation in the hermeneutics of
suspicion, presents itself to Nietzsche first and foremost as a fact. But
we need to ask: what kind of fact is this? Does it express Nietzsche’s
own value commitments, or does it describe the relation between the
value commitments of his contemporaries and the world? “Good” and
“bad” for whom?
In GM 2.7, Nietzsche makes it very clear that in highlighting the
pervasiveness of suffering, cruelty, blood, and horror, his intention
is not to give grist to the “mills of life-weariness” of those he calls
“the pessimists,” who take suffering, cruelty, blood, and horror to be
“bad” or “shameful” and thus to encourage life-denial. On the contrary,
Nietzsche emphasises that the fact that such origins are perceived
as “shameful” is the result of fairly recent cultural developments; his
thoughts, he says,
are meant expressly to show that back then, when humanity was not
yet ashamed of its cruelty, life on earth was more lighthearted than it
is now that there are pessimists. The darkening of the heavens over
man has always increased proportionally as man has grown ashamed
of man. (GM 2.7)
It is a central idea in the GM, then, that what one perceives as “bad”
or “shameful” origins—as pudenda origo (eKGWB 1885, 2[189])—is a
function of one’s evaluative commitments. While Nietzsche’s contem-
poraries tend to perceive suffering, cruelty, blood, and horror as always
bad or shameful, we also find in history the “reverse judgement” of
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those things as a “seductive lure to life.”13 Nietzsche’s claim that all
good things come from or were once bad things should therefore not be
heard as voicing Nietzsche’s own evaluations, but rather as describing
how the findings of truthful genealogical inquiry will appear to his
contemporaries. When Nietzsche speaks of bad or shameful origins, he
does not mean that they are bad or shameful in his eyes. We can mark
this distinction between Nietzsche’s endorsement of evaluations and
his description of how the findings of genealogy will be evaluated by
others thus: the point is not that they are bad or shameful, but that they
are evaluated-as-bad-or-shameful, where this does not carry an evalua-
tive commitment on Nietzsche’s part. “All good things were once bad
things” should be taken to mean: all things-now-evaluated-as-good
were once things-now-evaluated-as-bad.
This may appear to strengthen the connection between (a) and (b),
between naturalism and critique—not only is Nietzsche engaged in
naturalistic explanations, he is also committed to such explanations
looking fairly awful to his contemporaries: in the kind of world we
live in, they are bound to reveal what will be perceived as “tainted”
origins. But as we shall now see, Nietzsche’s own conclusion is rather
that uncovering such origins does not necessarily yield a critique.
(d)Origins in Themselves Cannot Subvert: Nietzsche repeatedly denies
that something’s having such-and-such origins ipso facto constitutes a
ground for its indictment. Two years before the publication of the GM,
he writes: “inquiry into the origin of our evaluations [ . . . ] is in no way
identical with a critique of them” (eKGWB 1885, 2[189]). And in Book
Five of The Gay Science, which appeared in the same year as the GM, he
points out:
13 See Janaway (2017a, 2017b).
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The mistake of the more subtle among [the historians of morality]
is that they uncover and criticize the possibly foolish opinions of a
people about their morality [ . . . ] and then think they have criticized
the morality itself. [ . . . ] A morality could even have grown out of an
error, and the realization of this fact would not so much as touch the
problem of its value. (GS 345)
Origins are not incriminating in themselves (though some may mis-
takenly regard them to be so incriminating). What criticism Nietzsche
offers of certain values hinges on their practical value as forces promoting
the “enjoyment,” “ennobling,” “knowledge,” and “development” of
life (eKGWB 1886, 7[6]):
One could have proven ever so unflattering things about the origins of
moral valuations: now that these forces are here, they can be used and
have their value as forces. Just as a regime [Herrschaft] can originate in
deceit and violence: its value lies in the fact that it is a regime.—Unless
all the force of moral valuations were dependent on the legitimacy of
its origins or more generally on a certain belief about their origins: in
which case the force of the belief in the valuewould be lost if the mistake
were discovered. (eKGWB 1884, 26[161])
On Nietzsche’s view of things, according to which there is blood and
horror at the basis of all things-now-evaluated-as-good, the question
is not whether our values have origins evaluated-as-shameful, but
whether we can live with the blood and horror. Far from animating his
own critique, the subversive inference from origins to critique is part of
what Nietzsche criticises:
Origin and critique of moral valuations. These two things do not
coincide, as is facilely supposed (this belief is itself already the result
of a moral judgment to the effect that “something that has come to be
in such and such a way is worth little because its origin is immoral”).
(eKGWB 1885, 2[131])
The origins that genealogical inquiry will tend to reveal are subversive
only in conjunction with a further belief licensing the inference from
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origin to condemnation. This further belief is itself an ethical attitude,
a second-order commitment to a certain way of thinking about values
which can be put into question.
We can now see that readings on which Nietzsche takes origins to
be in themselves properly capable of subversion face two problems.
The first is that the scope of the critique is too broad. Given (c), all
values would be undermined, which results in a nihilism violating
(b). The second problem is that this would have Nietzsche commit the
genetic fallacy, which is implausible in light of the four passages where
Nietzsche rejects the idea that origins are subversive in themselves—it
conflicts with (d).
This has led some to argue that while it may look like Nietzsche is
deriving critique from explanation, he is really doing something less
argumentative, such as attempting to alter our affects through powerful
rhetoric (Janaway 2007). But this reaction conflicts with the assumption
expressed in (b), that Nietzsche is presenting a rationally articulated
critique.
Insofar as we want to hold on to the idea that there is a genealogical
argument in the GM that does not target values tout court and avoids
the genetic fallacy, one might argue that it takes the form of a narrower,
internal critique—thatNietzsche is pinpointing contradictionswithin the
evaluative commitments of the genealogy’s addressees. This cashes out
the thought that what origins are perceived as shameful is a function
of one’s outlook. Hence, genealogy can have subversive effects if the
addressee’s values claim authority for themselves in terms which the revelation
of their true origins can undermine. Such internal readings can take several
forms. Nietzsche might be viewed as deriving subversive conclusions
about values from their
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(1) shameful historical origins: values V historically arose out of
motives perceived as shameful, such as hatred, ressentiment, and
cruelty;
(2) shameful psychological origins: values V now are psychologically
rooted in and expressions of motives perceived as shameful, such
as hatred, ressentiment, and cruelty;14
(3) functional origins: values V originate as functional responses
to basic needs, as tools for the satisfaction of further ends and
ultimately of the will to power;15
(4) contingent origins: values V are the product of various histor-
ical contingencies which fail to justify them against possible
rivals—they are not inevitable or definitively desirable, but ratio-
nally contingent;16,17
All four forms of internal critique exhibit what is perceived as
“higher” as originating in what is perceived as “lower.” This argumen-
tative structure is a form of local genealogical debunking:
Local Genealogical Debunking:
P1 Genealogical explanation of certain values V reveals them to have
origins O.
P2 Values V claim authority for themselves in terms that are incom-
patible with their having origins O.
14 See, e.g., Geuss (1981), Reginster (1997).
15 See Richardson (2004) and Guay (2006).
16 Here our argument connects with debates over whether beliefs can be debunked by
showing that one’s acceptance of them is orthogonal to their truth. Exploring this
connection would require more space than we can give it here, but our argument
can profitably be read with these debates in mind. See Srinivasan (2015), Mogensen
(2016), and DiPaolo and Simpson (2016).
17 See Nehamas (1985, ch. 4).
13 • Matthieu Queloz and Damian Cueni
P3 If values V claim authority for themselves in terms that are
incompatible with their having origins O, and they in fact have
origins O, then values V should be called into question.
C1 Genealogical explanation shows that values V should be called
into question.
Readings along the lines of (1)–(4) take Nietzsche to show that cer-
tain—notably Christian—values have origins that are incompatible
with the way Christianity understands itself and claims authority for
itself, so that by Christianity’s own lights, we should give it up.
But the problem with these readings is that they fail to contain the
full subversive force ofgenealogical inquiry and thus run afoul of the fact
that Nietzsche does not endorse remaining in nihilism. This is because
the commitments on which the subversive force hinges are not specific
to Christianity. This is obscured by talk of internal contradictions within
Christianity. But the commitments on which local genealogical debunking
hinges are not first-order commitments to specifically Christian values,
butmuch broader second-order commitments about values: commitments
specifying what origins bona fide values can properly possess. On
reading (1), the relevant second-order commitment is that higher values
have similarly high historical origins. On reading (2), it is that our
present values must be expressive of high-minded motives. On reading
(3), it is that moral reasons for action are genuinely distinct from, and
not derivative of, instrumental reasons for action. On reading (4), it is
that morality is pure of contingency, luck, and forces beyond voluntary
control.
This suggests that the relevant second-order commitment is nothing
other thanNietzsche’s recurrent concern—the ascetic conception of values
enshrined in the ascetic ideal:
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Ascetic Conception of Values (ACV): the highly valuedmust have higher
origins; it must be pure, free of any connection with contingency,
animal urges, human needs, self-interest, or power struggles.
In BeyondGood andEvil (BGE), the companion piece to theGM,Nietzsche
discusses the ACV under the heading of “the metaphysicians’ basic
faith, the faith in the opposition of values” (BGE 2).18 This is the conviction
that “[t]hings of the highest value must have another, separate origin
of their own,—they cannot be derived from this ephemeral, seductive,
deceptive, lowly world, from this mad chaos of confusion and desire”
(BGE 2)—what Clark calls “the normal ‘muck’ of human life” (2015, 60).
To be truly valuable, the higher must itself have higher origins (BGE
230). It must not have grown out of the merely natural, and a fortiori
not out of what is perceived as shameful. On Nietzsche’s view, it is to
provide appropriately pure origins that philosophers developed the
realm of forms, the mind of God, or the noumenal world—all of them
served as timeless homes to higher things, relative to which the lower
world of “life, nature, and history” (GS 344) could be demoted to the
status of a mere appearance (TI “Reason” 1). Instead of trying to explain
how the higher might have emerged from the normal muck of things,
“metaphysical philosophy has hitherto surmounted this difficulty by
denying that the one originates in the other” (HAH 1). This “type of
valuation,” Nietzsche says of philosophers, “lies behind all their logical
procedures” (BGE 2). It is “just their way of showing respect: the highest
should not grow out of the lowest, it should not grow at all [ . . . ]. It is
an objection for something to come from something else, it casts doubt
on its value” (TI “Reason” 4).
The key idea here is that in treating the revelation of a value’s shameful
origins as debunking it, we are undertaking a particular kind of second-order
18 Clark (1990, 177) also argues that the faith in the opposition of values finds its way
into the GM under the heading of the ascetic ideal.
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value commitment. In Nietzsche’s terms, the coincidence of genealogy
and critique is “itself already the result of a moral judgment to the effect
that ‘something that has come to be in such and such a way is worth
little because its origin is immoral’” (eKGWB 1885, 2[131]). To undertake
this second-order value commitment is to endorse (i) the inference from
something’s having a high value to its having high origins, and (ii) its
contrapositive, the inference from its failing to have high origins (by
having merely natural origins or even origins perceived as shameful)
to its failing to have a high value. For one who endorses this pattern
of reasoning, any connection of the higher with the normal muck of
things contaminates the purity of the higher. A value’s claim on us
will be vindicated only if the value possesses a suitably pure pedigree;
should a value be found to have origins that are perceived as lowly or
shameful, its authority will be undermined. It will be unmasked as a
mere illusion of value.
But in aworld inwhich all things-now-evaluated-as-good come from
things-now-evaluated-as-bad-or-shameful, the ACV endangers values
across the board—not only those we live by, but also any foreseeable
alternatives. This is a threat which those stuck in stage one atheism have
yet to realise:
The event [the Death of God] is far too great, too distant, too remote
from themultitude’s capacity forcomprehension even for the tidings of
it to be thought of as having arrived as yet. Much lessmay one suppose
that many people know as yet what this event really means—and
how much must collapse now that this faith has been undermined
because it was built upon this faith, propped up by it, grown into it:
for example, the whole of our European morality. (GS 343)
Nietzsche, recognising that his contemporaries—like George Eliot (TI
“Untimely” 5)—remain stage one atheists who accept the Death of
God while holding on to Christian values, nevertheless considers the
transition to stage two inevitable in the long run: combined with the
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conviction that genealogy will unearth natural origins and a large dose
of blood and horror, the idea that the higher must remain pure of any
association with such things inexorably entrains the conclusion that all
first-order value commitments must be abandoned—it leads to global
genealogical debunking:
Global Genealogical Debunking:
P1 Genealogy is bound to reveal our values to have origins O.
P2 All our values claim authority for themselves in terms that are
incompatible with their having origins O.
P3 If all our values claim authority for themselves in terms that are
incompatible with their having origins O, and they in fact have
origins O, then all our values should be called into question.
C1 Genealogy is bound to show that all our values should be called
into question.
Attempts to narrow the scope of Nietzsche’s critique by interpreting it
as internal fail, because Nietzsche presents these values as problematic
according to a standard, the ACV, that is far more general. This subverts
values across the board, depriving us not only of Christian values, but
also of alternatives.
2. Nietzsche’s Real Target: The Ascetic Conception of Values
Starting out from the question of how to derive critique from genealog-
ical explanation, we ended up with the question of how genealogical
explanation can fail to be critical. What renders Christian values sus-
ceptible to genealogical debunking is not in fact specific to them, but
turns out to be a broader commitment endangering our values across
the board: the ACV. On this conception, our values resist being under-
stood in naturalistic terms. The only way to sustain first-order value
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commitments is to foster ignorance of their true origins with myths,
illusions and lies. But here a further idea comes into play, namely the
commitment to truthfulnesswhich both Nietzsche and the outlook he
examines share in some form.19 Truthfulness fuels a concern to eschew
myths, illusions, and lies. It encourages reflection and demands that
one render one’s situation transparent to oneself through various forms
of inquiry, including genealogical inquiry.
The resulting combination of (i) a first-order commitment to truth-
fulness, (ii) a world in which everything has a tainted and contingent
history, and (iii) a second-order commitment to the ACV is unstable.
Because of (i), we are led to move beyond comforting myths and to
inquire into the real origins of our values; because of (ii), these origins
will turn out to be what is deemed lowly; and because of (iii), this
finding will have a destabilising effect. This issues in a situation in
whichwe can neither go on believing in the revelation stories and origin
myths in terms of which our values claim authority for themselves, nor
go on respecting their claim on us in light of what we know about their
actual origins.
Ouraim in this section is to showhow, in theGM,Nietzsche proposes
to get out of this bind by rejecting (iii), the ACV, to make room for a
truthful naturalism that is not subversive. Nietzsche’s hope is that, by
engaging us in genealogical reflection, he can impress upon us that
something is wrong with the ACV.
The uneasy combination of (i), (ii), and (iii), Nietzsche thinks, is the
characteristic predicament of modernity.20 One is driven to abandon
comforting myths and illusions, but finds little solace in the truths
19 For the claim that truthfulness is part of the ascetic ideal, see GM 3.24, 27. For the
claim that it is among Nietzsche’s own commitments, see GM 1.1; AC 50; eKGWB
1886, 5[71].
20 EH “Beyond” 2; Williams (2000).
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replacing them. One “forbids oneself every kind of clandestine access
to afterworlds and false divinities—but cannot endure this world though
one does not want to deny it” (eKGWB 1887, 11[99]). This process of
abandonment without replacement entrains the dissolution of one’s
entire evaluative outlook:
This antagonism—not to esteem what we know, and not to be allowed
any longer to esteem the lies we should like to tell ourselves—results
in a process of dissolution. (eKGWB 1886, 5[71])
This process of dissolution issues in nihilism, understood as the view
that nothing has any value or meaning (eKGWB 1885, 2[127]). The
truthful disenchantment of the world is not only “to a high degree
ascetic,” but also “to a still higher degree nihilistic”: it drains the world
of value and meaning until, like an “isolated arctic traveller,” one is
left with nothing but lifeless “winter landscapes”: “Here there is snow,
here life has become silent; the last crowings heard here are ‘To what
end?,’ ‘In vain!,’ ‘Nada!’—here nothing more prospers or grows [ . . . ]”
(GM 3.26). It is in this sense that nihilism is the “necessary consequence
of hitherto existing valuations,” and “the danger of dangers” (eKGWB
1885, 2[100]). When viewed truthfully through the ACV, the world
seems to leave no room for values.
The question is which path out of this nihilism-engendering triad
Nietzsche advocates. There has been much discussion of Nietzsche’s
attitude towards (i), the commitment to truthfulness and its relation to
illusion and art—but while he criticises forms of truthfulness which
encourage the pursuit of truth at the expense of life, he is not usually
taken to give up on truthfulness altogether.21 (i) thus remains in place,
and whether (ii) obtains is largely not up to us. This leaves the question
21 Anderson (2005), Gemes (1992, 2006), Harper (2015), Jenkins (2012, 2016), Owen
(2003, 2007), Reginster (2013), Schacht (2013).
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whether we can overcome (iii), the ACV. We argue that this is the path
Nietzsche recommends.
Nietzsche’s thought is that the nihilist does not go far enough in
recognising contingency. Nihilism stems from the idea that purity from
contingency is what we would really like to have, because that is what
makes the recognition that the world does not offer this kind of purity
look like a disappointment. Against this, Nietzsche points out that the
recognition that the world is more contingent than the ACV can allow
is a step away from one’s values, but not yet from an ascetic conception
of them; there is a further step to be taken, and it is only then that
we abandon the ascetic ideal, of which the ACV is the most tenacious
element: it is what generates the very idea that something is lacking.
This is the conclusion reached by Nietzsche after spending the
third treatise of the GM inquiring into the underlying meaning of the
ascetic ideal. In the final section, he declares: “Precisely this is what
the ascetic ideal means: that something was lacking, that an enormous
void surrounded man” (GM 3.28). To fully abandon the ascetic ideal is
to abandon this idea as well—to adopt a perspective from which the
world’s being more of a muck and mire than the ACV can allow is no
longer experienced as a form of privation. If we take the leap into the
void, it is seen not to be a void at all.
Nietzsche thus concludes that nihilism is a consequence of a partic-
ularly well-concealed asceticism—it is a counterfactual asceticism, just
as it is counterfactual religiosity to conclude that if God does not exist,
everything is permitted.22 To endorse this inference is to think that,
were it not the case that everything was permitted, this would have to
be because there was a God—which is still a religious idea. By the
same token, it is still a form of asceticism to conclude that if the sort of
22 See Williams’s critique of “counterfactual scientism” (2006, 187).
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purity demanded by the ACV is not available because all values have
originated in a natural world pervaded by suffering, then nothing has
value. To think that the origins available on a naturalised conception
of the world leave no room for values is to remain committed to the
ascetic ideal: it is to hold on to an ascetic conception of what kind of
world values require to gain a foothold. This is why the ascetic ideal
eventually expresses itself in a will to nothingness. Its will to truth leads
from the disenchantment of the world via a demanding conception
of what counts as something—in the sense of something valuable—to
the conclusion that we are left with nothing. It involves the idea that
if anything were to have value, it would have to do so on the terms of
the ascetic conception, and this is still an ascetic idea—one we must
relinquish in order to perceive values that emerged out of the normal
muck of things as genuine values.
Nietzsche’s fundamental problem with the outlook of his contem-
poraries, then, is that it is prone to dissolve into nihilism due to the
ascetic ideal, which combines an injunction to be truthful with the ACV.
This combination issues in dissolution, because it makes it increasingly
clear that the kind of purity demanded by the ACV is unavailable while
blinding one to available alternatives. Hence Nietzsche’s conclusion
that the ascetic ideal is “the true doom in the history of European health”
(GM 3.21).
Throughout his work from 1878 onwards, but under a variety of
names, Nietzsche rejects the ACV and the reasoning it licenses, calling
it a “mistake in reasoning” (HAH 1; see also D 49; GS 344; BGE 2; TI
“Reason” 4, 5).23 He encourages us to “doubt right here at the threshold,
where it is needed most” (BGE 2). Genealogies are indeed subversive
by the ascetic’s standards, but while the ascetic takes this as a reason to
23 Amore fine-grained analysis than we have room for here might of course bring into
focus various differences between the ideas we lump together as the ACV.
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give up the objects of the genealogies, Nietzsche takes it as a reason to
give up the standard. He is thus a critic of genealogical debunking in
the following sense:
Critique of Genealogical Debunking:
P1 Our values claim authority for themselves in terms that include a
second-order commitment to the idea that bona fide values must
not have origins of the kind perceived as lowly or shameful.
P2 On a naturalistic view of the world on which it is pervaded
by blood and horror, all values will turn out to have origins of
the kind perceived as lowly or shameful, thus permitting Global
Genealogical Debunking.
P3 If our values claim authority for themselves in terms that permit
Global Genealogical Debunking, then either all our values should be
called into question, which issues in nihilism, or the commitment
permitting Global Genealogical Debunking should be abandoned.
P4 Nihilism should be avoided at all costs.
C1 Therefore, the commitment to the idea that bona fide values must
not have origins of the kind perceived as lowly or shameful should
be abandoned.
The text standardly treated as the prime instance of genealogical de-
bunking thus turns out to be part of a critique of genealogical debunking.
Nietzsche is evaluating, not just our values, but even the ways in which
we think about our values according to whether they are life-enhancing.
If there is this deeper critique afoot in the GM, one might wonder
why so much of the GM describes the origins of particular first-order
values. Our reading accounts for this by maintaining that there are
not one but two kinds of critique at work in the GM, a first-order
critique of values and a second-order critique of the way we think
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about values. The presence of one does not exclude the presence of the
other—on the contrary, our claim is that the first-order critique, which
has been the focus of commentators, presupposes and onlymakes sense
against the background of the second-order critique. To adherents of the
ACV, any naturalistic explanation will seem to blacken its object. The
difference between natural origins suggesting that a value promotes
life and natural origins suggesting that it is harmful to life can be
but a difference between two shades of black. It is only once we have
relinquished the ACV that there is room for naturalistic explanation
to be anything other than subversive, and that genuine reevaluation
becomes possible.
But if the first-order critique presupposes the success of the second-
order critique,why does Nietzsche not proceed in reverse order,making
room for naturalism without subversion before giving us his naturalistic
explanations? A possible answer is that there is a performative and
therapeutic rationale for proceeding in this fashion: it allows the first-
order critique to contribute to the second-order critique. By confronting
his readers with a series of rhetorically charged vignettes and strong
images depicting the lowly origins of Christian morality, Nietzsche puts
pressure on the second-order commitment that the higher must not
have emerged from the lower, thereby driving stage one atheists among
his readers towards stage two. Although he himself does not ultimately
endorse this sort of genealogical debunking, he can nevertheless exploit
it for therapeutic purposes, exacerbating the destabilising tendencies
of the ACV and precipitating a crisis of nihilism.24 On this reading, the
relevant question is not whether our values in fact have precisely the
origins Nietzsche depicts them as having. It is whether we think about
24 Here we are indebted to Ken Gemes and Alexander Prescott-Couch.
23 • Matthieu Queloz and Damian Cueni
our values in terms that render them susceptible to subversion through
the confrontation with origins of that kind.
Then, however, Nietzsche’s second-order critique of the ACV urges
the reader to move on to stage three, to shake off the expectations
that fuelled genealogical debunking and to turn a critical eye on such
wholesale genealogical debunking itself. Nietzsche’s strategy is thus
two-pronged: stage one atheists will be moved towards stage two by his
genealogical stories, and stage two atheist will be moved towards stage
three by his attack on the ACV.25 Ideally, one comes out of reading the
GM as a stage three atheist, holding second-order commitments that
no longer license global genealogical debunking. One is then able to
contemplate the possibility of one’s values having the origins Nietzsche
attributes to them in the GMwithout feeling one’s commitment to these
values to be compromised. One no longer experiences the lack of higher
origins as a lack. One can in principle be confident in one’s values even
if they have lowly origins, much as, in Foucault’s words, a “real science
is able to accept even the shameful, dirty stories of its beginning” (1988,
15).
Indeed, reading Nietzsche’s GM, stage three atheists would have
trouble identifying the critical import of the genealogical stories. Ar-
guably, time has shown that it is possible to emancipate ourselves from
the ACV while retaining secular descendants of Christian values, and
the trouble that contemporary readers have in seeing a non-fallacious
critical import in Nietzsche’s GM is just an expression of this fact.26
25 We are indebted to Ken Gemes for this way of putting the point.
26 That this ability for affirmation in the face of lowly origins cannot be taken for granted
is poignantly brought out by the developments of Nietzsche’s own day. Fritz Stern,
in The Politics of Cultural Despair (1961), retraces the rise of the nineteenth-century
Kulturkritiker or “Germanic critics” through the lens of a (notably early) sympathetic
reading of Nietzsche. Stern argues that the Death of God and Darwin’s theory of
evolutionwere felt bymany to drain theworld of all values, and that a form of cultural
despair was spreading in Europe (1961, 282–84). This led to the rise of the “Germanic
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Yet if naturalistic genealogies do not necessarily blacken their objects
once one has abandoned the ACV, this allows them to play a differ-
ent and subtler role in first-order critiques of values. Abandoning the
ACV opens up a contrast range within which first-order critiques of
values can, through more complex inferential paths than ACV-fuelled
genealogical debunking, shed more or less flattering light on their
object.27 Some genealogical explanations may, for instance, still be sub-
versive by revealing the dysfunctionality of certain values. Values might
turn out to be harmful by being repressive of our drives and injurious
to our health; or by being insufficiently tailored to different types; or
by constraining individual potential. But a genealogical explanation
might equally prove vindicatory by highlighting the functionality of
a value in any of these respects. Abandoning the ACV is thus a neces-
sary—though not a sufficient—condition for naturalistic explanation
not to be subversive, andNietzsche is to be creditedwith perceiving this
more clearly than his fellow naturalists. He points the way to naturalism
without subversion.
critics”—people like Paul de Lagarde, Julius Langbehn, and Arthur Moeller van
den Bruck—who, in an attempt to compensate for these losses, mythologised their
cultural past to conjure up a fiction of German unity which developed a fateful
influence in interwar Germany. Moeller van den Bruck, author of a book entitled
The Third Reich, was an avid reader of Nietzsche and claimed him as an ally. But
our analysis shows that Nietzsche is precisely the opposite. Both Nietzsche and the
Germanic critics diagnosed tensions between how they understood their values and
how they understood the world. But whereas the Germanic critics sought to react to
the tension by re-idealising the world and their cultural history, Nietzsche attacked
what created the tension in the first place.
27 SeeCueni andQueloz (Manuscript) aswell asQueloz (2017,2018b,2019,Forthcoming-
a, b, c) for characterisations of some of those inferential paths.
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3. Nietzsche’s Vision:
Reflective Stability and the Pessimism of Strength
Nietzsche thus sees the ACV as forcing a choice upon us: either we
deceive ourselves about the world’s true shape by idealising it with
myths and illusions, or we see it for what it is and embrace nihilism.
His way out of this bind, we have argued, is to reject the ACV. This
reading of what Nietzsche opposes offers some indication of what he
advocates instead. In this final section, we draw out the consequences
of our reading for Nietzsche’s positive vision.
If they are to escape the choice between untruthfulness and nihilism,
healthy individuals are going to need an outlook that is stable under
reflection. They are going to have to satisfy three conditions: (i) living
truthfully; (ii) negating,orat least not endorsing, theACV; (iii) having the
psychological strength required to bear the truth about their outlook—to
affirm it in the face of its true history. (i) is clear enough, so let us focus
on (ii) and (iii).
In the Untimely Meditations (UM 2.1), Nietzsche describes how
uncovering origins could be life-denying by alienating one from what
one values; but in his laterwork,Nietzsche takes a further step,exploring
the thought that what effect genealogy has on our values is a function
of whether we take their authority to depend on their having certain
origins. This leads Nietzsche to the conclusion that achieving a life-
affirming outlook—an outlook that enables one to know life for what
it is and still say “yes” to it—must involve one’s coming to think and
live by ideas that are stable under reflection, including reflection about
where they come from and what their coming to be ours involved.
That an evaluative outlook should be stable under truthful reflection
is necessary if the holders of the outlook are to live truthfully without
being driven into nihilism.
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As we saw, an important threat to this reflective stability is the ACV
licensing the inference from origins to subversion. But as Nietzsche
points out, the inference that “something that has come to be in such and
such a way is worth little because its origin is immoral” itself involves a
“moral judgement” (eKGWB 1885, 2[131]), and a moral judgement, for
Nietzsche, is not a logical truth, but an interpretation, an Auslegung.28
Given a conception of values that lacked this particular interpretation
andwas at least in this respect non-ascetic, one would in principle be in a
position to affirm values with natural and not altogether suffering-free
origins. Hence requirement (ii) on achieving a life-affirming outlook:
that one should have a non-ascetic conception of values.
Merely conceiving of values differently is not yet enough, however,
to ensure that one will be able to affirm one’s values when confronted
with the origins that Nietzsche expects them to have. One also needs
the psychological strength to bear whatever it is that inquiry into the
history of our values might bring to light. This is requirement (iii),
which is not a matter of principles or how we think of things, but a
matter of strength of character. Unlike principles, such strength comes
in degrees. The measure of one’s strength will be how much truth
about one’s values one can incorporate into one’s view of them while
still affirming them.29 For Nietzsche, such truth is bound to involve a
great deal of “harsh, ugly, unpleasant” (GM 1.1) truth. It will reveal
the history of our values to involve suffering, for instance. But for
Nietzsche, the problem is not purposeful suffering, which one endures
for a reason, but senseless suffering, incurred as a result of bad luck,
uncertainty, or sudden downturns (GM 2.7, 3.28). The real problem is
28 See eKGWB 1885, 2[90]; BGE 187; TI “Morality” 5.
29 In the GM, Nietzsche talks about the ability to digest the past (3.16), the strength to
endure the truth about humankind and to bear a true biography (3.19–20). In EH,
he notes that he takes the real standard of value to be how much truth a spirit dares
and endures (P, 3).
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the contingency of suffering. This is why Nietzsche defines “evil” as
“chance, uncertainty, and the sudden” (eKGWB 1887, 10[21]). Fear of
the consequences of these contingent forces is what generates the need
either to give contingency the form of necessity by finding reasons
for suffering or to demote the contingent realm of life, nature, and
history to the rank of mere appearance. In its Schopenhauerian form,
the pessimistic awareness of this state of things leads to the negation of
life, the “death-wish” (eKGWB 1885, 2[100]). Yet in the form advocated
by Nietzsche, that same pessimistic awareness issues in the affirmation
of life. The former might be labelled the pessimism of weakness; the
latter Nietzsche himself calls the pessimism of strength.30 He introduces
it in the 1886 preface to the Birth of Tragedy (BT “Self-Criticism” 1)
and expands on it in his notebooks: “Let us dwell a moment,” he
writes, “on this symptom of the highest culture—I call it the pessimism
of strength” (eKGWB 1887, 10[21]). It is the state in which mankind
fearlessly accepts contingency—in which it no longer feels the need to
rationalise the world or to deny its reality (eKGWB 1887, 10[21]). On the
very grounds that formerly motivated life-denial, mankind manages to
affirm life: “the sense of security and belief in law and calculability enter
consciousness in the form of satiety and disgust—while the delight in
chance, the uncertain and sudden becomes titillating” (eKGWB 1887,
10[21]).31 To exhibit pessimism of strength with relation to our values
and their history is to balance awareness of their contingency with
30 On the affirmation of life, see Reginster (2006). On Nietzsche’s relation to Schopen-
hauer, see Janaway (1998). On the pessimism of strength, see Soll (1988), Owen (2007,
18), and Williams (2012; 2014, ch. 37).
31 There is a puzzle in Nietzsche scholarship about why Nietzsche says that one should
affirm life on the grounds that formerly motivated life-denial (Came 2013, 210). If
one takes suffering to be what motivates denial, this generates the sadistic ideal that
one should affirm life because of suffering. Our reading, on the other hand, yields
the claim that one should affirm life because of the titillating delight one takes in
chance, uncertainty, and the sudden.
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their unwavering affirmation. It is to treat the values we actually find,
with the origins they actually have, as genuine values. This, as Bernard
Williams emphasises in one of his more Nietzschean passages, is
. . . [not] a picture that is a product of despair, a mere second-best for a
world in which the criteria of true objectivity and ethical truth-seeking
have proved hard to find. To recognise how we are placed in this
respect is, if anything, an affirmation of strength. (1995, 148)
One consequence of this reading is that we can sensibly raise the
question whether we can retain secular descendants of Christian val-
ues—provided they help us to live and do not hamper flourishing—if
we give up the ACV and can bear the truth about them. Prima facie,
Nietzsche does not seem to think so: he argues in TI that “Christian
morality [ . . . ] stands or falls along with belief in God” (“Untimely”
5). Such passages may seem to constitute an obstacle to our reading.
But the key is to recognise that there are two distinct ways of feeling
one’s attachment to one’s values to be unthreatened by the Death of
God: one may be an atheist stuck at stage one, who fails to see the
ramifications of the Death of God; or one may be an atheist at stage
three, who has thoroughly overcome the ascetic perspective on values.
When Nietzsche castigates the likes of George Eliot, he is objecting to
the failure of his contemporaries to recognise the instability of stage
one atheism. But one should not conclude from this that Nietzsche
advocates coming to rest at stage two. He also criticises people who
remain at stage two, where the Death of God is acknowledged to lead
to nihilism. For Nietzsche, this is “a way of remaining and staying stuck
in precisely those Christian and ascetic moral perspectives in which
one had renounced faith along with the faith in God” (GS 357). Nietzsche
thus criticises both stage one and stage two atheists, but only to push
through to stage three.
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A crucial contrast for Nietzsche, then, is between those who view
the origins revealed by genealogical inquiry as a threat to their values
and shun truthful genealogical inquiry, and those who feel capable
of affirming their values in the face of these origins and embrace
genealogical inquiry—between those who “like to put questions of
origins and beginnings out of [their] mind,” and those who display
a “contrary inclination” (HAH 1). The same contrast reappears at the
beginning of BGE, where Nietzsche says that “wemust await the arrival
of a new breed of philosophers, ones whose taste and inclination are
somehow the reverse of those we have seen so far” (BGE 2). This new
breedwith reverse tastes,wehave suggested,consists of individualswho
have freed themselves of the ascetic perspective anddisplay a pessimism
of strength to the extent that they can discern and affirm things of value
even in a world in which these turn out to have links to the normal
muck of life. This, Nietzsche thinks, is what a disenchanted world in
which everything is in someway tied upwith contingency and suffering
demands of us. And once we meet these demands, genealogical inquiry
ceases to appear uniformly subversive. Then—and only then—the
familiar Nietzschean project comes into view, of differentiating between
values according to whether they have helped us to live.
Conclusion
For Nietzsche, genealogical debunking is in the first instance a problem.
Because our values have traditionally been understood in terms that
render them incompatiblewith the origins genealogy is likely to bring to
light,genealogical inquirymust issue in nihilism. By contrast to “English
genealogists” (GM P 4) in the vein of Hume, Darwin, and Rée, who
optimistically assume that genealogical explanations will strengthen
our confidence in our values by revealing their utility,Nietzsche’s darker
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outlook leads him to recognise that there is a prior task for the naturalist:
in a world in which all things-evaluated-as-good come from things-
evaluated-as-bad and values anyway resist naturalistic explanation, one
first needs to make room for naturalism without subversion.
Such a reading combines two traditionally opposed views of Niet-
zsche, the postmodern view of him as concerned with the destabilising
force of history, and the naturalist view of him as concerned with mak-
ing sense of values in non-metaphysical terms. Nietzsche is concerned
with the critical force of history, but as an obstacle to naturalistic self-
understanding. The image of Nietzsche as a genealogical debunker has
to be turned on its head.
This paper has focused on the idea that bringing into view the
differences between values presupposes ridding oneself of second-order
ideas that level out these differences. Nietzsche shows us that for the
project of the piecemeal evaluation of values against the background
of their history to come clearly into focus, we must first purge our
conception of values of the last remnants of asceticism. But given that
this project has yet to come clearly into focus, and given that debates
over howvalues fit into the naturalworld rage on, there is a real question
whether we have fully done so.32
32 Thanks to Ken Gemes, Andrew Huddleston, Chris Janaway, Alexander Prescott-
Couch, Scott Jenkins, John Skorupski, Hallvard Lillehammer, Richard Elliott, Chris
Sykes, Johannes Niederhauser, and all the participants in the Nietzsche seminar at
Birkbeck College, University of London. Thanks are also due to Johannes Steizinger,
Rebekka Hufendiek, Jelscha Schmid, Markus Wild, Martin Kusch, Jan Müller, and
Claudio Baldi for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. This work was
supported by grant N° P0BSP1_162025 of the Swiss National Science Foundation.
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